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With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility: 
Proposed Principles of Digital Due Process for ICT Companies 
- Dawn Carla Nunziato 
Introduction 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) companies like 
Google/YouTube, Facebook, Yahoo, and Twitter are in control of an enormous amount 
of expression on the Internet.  More so than any individual country, these companies are 
responsible for making decisions with regard to a vast amount of Internet expression.   
They host billions of pages of Internet content, while responding on a daily basis to 
countless requests from countries and individuals around the world to take down content 
that is deemed objectionable or illegal.  These powerful ICT companies have become the 
de facto sovereigns of cyberspace, with the power to balance freedom of expression 
against public and private interests on a day-to-day basis, as they make determinations 
about whether and when to accede to requests to censor speech.  In the words of First 
Amendment scholar Jeffrey Rosen, the “fresh-faced tech executives … in charge of their 
companies’ content policies… [have] more power over who gets heard around the globe 
than any politician or bureaucrat—more power, in fact, than any president…”1  These 
decision-makers have insufficient guidance and inadequate guidelines for carrying out 
these awesome responsibilities that have a dramatic impact on the global contours of 
freedom of speech.   
Google, for example, is responsible for facilitating seventy-one percent of the 
world’s Internet searches.2  As the owner of YouTube, Google is also responsible for 
hosting one hundred hours of new video content that users post every minute.3  This is in 
addition to its ownership of other widely used applications, including the blog site 
Blogger, the photo-sharing site Picasa, and the social networking site Orkut.  Executives 
at Google are responsible for making determinations about which controversial content 
stays up and which comes down. Twitter decision-makers enjoy similar, vast power to 
determine which of the one billion tweets sent every five days get disseminated around 
the world and which get blocked.4  The same goes for Facebook, Yahoo, and other global 
ICT giants. 
What guidelines should these companies follow in determining which content to 
facilitate and which to take down? Under what circumstances should ICT companies 
1	  Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, Facebook and the New Global Battle Over
the Future of Free Speech, April 29, 2013
2 http://www.netmarketshare.com/search-engine-market-share.aspx?qprid=4&qpcustomd=0 
3 http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html 
4 http://www.statisticbrain.com/twitter-statistics/ 
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accede to governments’ or individuals’ requests to censor content? How, if at all, should 
they implement such censorship requests?  Given that most of these powerful companies 
are U.S. based, some have contended that these companies should implement the United 
States’ speech-protective values and refuse censorship requests from other, less speech-
protective countries.5  For example, if France requests that a U.S. based ICT company 
like Yahoo block content that violates French hate-speech laws, Yahoo arguably should 
simply ignore the request and export the First Amendment to other countries.  But after a 
French court decision in 2000 rendered Yahoo criminally liable in France for failing to 
block French citizens’ access to certain hate speech content it hosted, Yahoo – and other 
global ICT companies -- began to rethink this approach.  Although initially resisting 
France’s power to influence what content Yahoo hosts – resulting in lengthy legal battles 
-- Yahoo ultimately modified its policies to prohibit hosting of hate speech content.  
Instead of Yahoo exporting the First Amendment, it would seem in this instance that 
France exported its own less speech-protective laws to the U.S. and the rest of the world.  
How should global ICT companies respond to countries’ requests to censor content in 
light of the Yahoo-France dispute, in which France asserted the power to seize Yahoo’s 
local assets and detain local Yahoo executives for failing to comply with its laws? Is 
there a middle ground between imposing the First Amendment on the rest of the world, 
and acceding to every other country’s speech-restrictive censorship requests? How should 
global ICT companies balance these myriad competing concerns, amidst vastly 
conflicting regional free speech regimes? 
In this chapter, I argue that ICT companies should adopt and implement a set of 
procedural guidelines embodying principles of digital due process that protect the due 
process rights that are essential to democratic societies, while respecting the autonomy of 
each democratic society to determine the contours of substantive free speech rights for its 
citizens.  Protecting due process rights is the first step in protecting and respecting human 
rights, which transnational corporations – as well as countries – have a duty to protect.  
As United Nations’ Special Representative of the Secretary-General emphasized in his 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, business enterprises as well as nations have a 
duty to respect human rights.6  An important part of respecting human rights is respecting 
the rights of individuals to receiving due process in the protection of their rights.  ICT 
companies should adopt and implement a set of due process principles that, I argue, are 
implicit in the free speech and due process jurisprudence of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the United 
States Constitution.  Before implementing any country’s request that they block 
content, ICT companies should (1) ensure that the requesting country has 
articulated within its laws a narrow, specific description of what speech is illegal, to 
5 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 1. 
6 See Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie,  Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework.  A/HRC/17/31. 
3	  
confine the discretion of decision-makers and to provide fair notice to individuals of 
what speech is illegal in the first instance; (2) ensure that affected parties have 
received notice in cases where their speech has been deemed illegal and have had the 
opportunity to be heard in a fair, independent, and impartial proceeding before a 
censorship decision is ordered; (3) require that the requesting country has issued a 
narrowly tailored, final judicial decision adjudicating the subject speech as illegal; 
(4) implement the resulting blocking order only within the country mandating such 
blocking; and (5) implement the resulting blocking order in an open and 
transparent manner.   Below I explore the sources of these principles of digital due 
process for Internet free in the International Covenant, the European Convention, and the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Substantive and Procedural Protections for the Right to Freedom of Expression 
While international, European, and U.S. instruments provide for substantive 
protections for the right to freedom of expression, the language of these instruments 
allows for substantial discretion to be exercised by different countries in construing these 
provisions.  Although there is a resultant wide variation among countries regarding 
substantive protections for speech – including which categories of speech are protected 
and which are unprotected – there is a growing convergence regarding procedural 
protections for speech.  Below I first briefly explore the substantive dimensions before 
turning to the procedural dimensions of protection for freedom of expression. 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),7 which has 
been adopted by 167 parties and is considered a binding international law treaty, provides 
in Article 19 that: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in
the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.8
3. [These rights] may . . . be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre 
public), or of public health or morals.9 
The right to freedom of expression is also protected under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which has been signed by 47 nations.  Article 10 of the European 
Convention provides:  
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 
Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N.Doc A/6316 (1966) (hereinafter ICCPR). 
8 ICCPR, supra note 31, Art. 19. 
9 ICCPR, supra note 31, Art. 19. The ICCPR provides further, in Article 20, that any propaganda 
for war or advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility, or violence, is prohibited by law. Id., Art. 20. 
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Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers….  
 
The exercise of these freedoms . . . may be subject to such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary.10 
 
Finally, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press . . . .”  The jurisprudence developed in interpreting and applying these 
protections for free speech not only has a substantive dimension of which 
categories of speech to protect and which to restrict—which differ from country 
to country11—but also has important procedural dimensions, which require that 
“sensitive tools” be implemented to distinguish between protected and 
unprotected speech. 12  As free speech theorist Henry Monaghan explains, 
“procedural guarantees play an equally large role in protecting freedom of speech; 
indeed, they assume an importance fully as great as the validity of the substantive 
rule of law to be applied….Whenever [freedom of expression] claims are 
involved, sensitive procedural devices are necessary.”13  
 
While there is great variation among countries regarding substantive protections 
for speech – including which types of speech are illegal --  there is more widespread 
agreement regarding the procedures that are essential to ensure meaningful protections 
for speech.  These procedural protections were recently expounded upon by the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression in his May 2011 Report to the Human Rights Council. While recognizing 
that countries enjoy some discretion to restrict child pornography, hate speech, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ETS 5), 213 U.N.T.S. 222 entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by 
Protocol 11 (ETS 155) which entered into force May 11, 1994 (hereinafter European 
Convention). 
 
11 See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A 
Comparative Legal Analysis of the Freedom of Speech (2006); Robert A. Sedler, Freedom of 
Speech: The United States versus The Rest of the World, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 377; Stephanie 
Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law 
Concerning Hate Speech, 14 Berk. J. Int’l L 1 (1996). 
12 Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
13 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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defamation, incitement to genocide, discrimination, hostility, or violence, the Special 
Rapporteur explained that: 
 
Any limitation to the right to freedom of expression must pass the 
following [multi]-part, cumulative test:  
 
It must be provided by law, which is clear and accessible to everyone 
(principles of predictability and transparency);  
 
It must pursue one of the purposes set out in article 19, paragraph 3, of the 
[International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], namely (i) to 
protect the rights or reputations of others, or (ii) to protect national 
security or of public order, or of public health or morals (principle of 
legitimacy); 
 
It must be proven as necessary and the least restrictive means required to 
achieve the purported aim (principles of necessity and proportionality)[;] 
 
[It] must be applied by a body which is independent of any political, 
commercial, or other unwarranted influences in a manner that is neither 
arbitrary nor discriminatory, and with adequate safeguards against abuse, 
including the possibility of challenge and remedy against its abusive 
application.14  
 
Similarly, European and U.S. free speech jurisprudence embodies procedural 
requirements for any abridgements of the right to freedom of expression.  Within the 
context of United States First Amendment jurisprudence, courts have constructed a 
powerful “body of procedural law that defines the manner in which they and other bodies 
must evaluate and resolve First Amendment claims — a First Amendment ‘due 
process.’”15 In so doing, courts have developed “a comprehensive system of procedural 
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.”16 
 
Digital Due Process Principle 1: Before implementing any country’s 
request that they block content, ICT companies should ensure that the 
requesting country has articulated within its laws a narrow, specific 
description of what speech is illegal, to confine the discretion of decision-
makers and to provide fair notice to individuals of what speech is illegal 
in the first instance.  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, United Nations Human Rights Council, at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf 
15 See Henry Monaghan, “First Amendment Due Process,” 83 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1970). 
16 See Monaghan, supra note 43. 
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In democratic societies, individuals have a right to conduct their lives so as to 
conform their conduct to the dictates of the law in order to avoid violations of the law.   
As the United States Supreme Court has explained, “Living under a rule of law entails 
various suppositions, one of which is that [all persons] are entitled to be informed as to 
what the State commands or forbids.”17  This in turn requires laws that clearly and 
precisely indicate what conduct is illegal, so that individuals can steer clear of such 
conduct.  Because of the paramount importance of freedom of expression to democratic 
societies, it is especially important that laws regulating speech do so in a narrow and 
precise manner, to avoid creating a chilling effect on expression. Although democratic 
countries, as sovereign nations, enjoy the power to determine what categories of speech 
are illegal (subject to the dictates of the International Covenant and European 
Convention), they should formulate laws articulating which categories of speech are 
illegal in as narrow and precise a manner as language permits.   Therefore, before 
implementing a blocking order from a country, ICT companies should require that the 
requesting country has articulated within its laws a narrow, specific description of what 
speech is illegal, to confine the discretion of decision-makers and to provide fair notice to 
individuals of what speech is illegal in the first instance. The International Covenant, the 
European Convention, and the U.S. First Amendment each provides support for the first 
proposed principle of digital due process, as I explain below.   
The International Covenant requires that any limit on the right to freedom of 
expression be provided by a law that is transparent, clear, and accessible to everyone, 
such that it is predictable that one’s speech will be subject to regulation.  In addition, in 
its Article 10 jurisprudence, the European Court of Human Rights has also made clear 
that Article 10 requires that laws restricting speech must be “clear and precise” and must 
indicate with sufficiently clarity the scope of any legal discretion enjoyed by the 
decision-maker and the manner of its exercise.  Notably, in a 2012 case involving the 
wholesale blocking of the entire Google Sites platform within Turkey – discussed in 
greater detail below -- the European Court of Human Rights had occasion to reiterate the 
requirements for laws restriction freedom of expression.  The Court explained that 
individuals whose conduct is affected by laws restricting freedom of expression must be 
able to foresee the law’s consequences, and therefore the law restricting expression must 
be formulated with sufficient precision to enable any individual to regulate his conduct 
under the law.  This requirement affords individuals legal protection against arbitrary 
interferences by public authorities with rights guaranteed by the Convention.18  
In addition, under U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, laws restricting 
expression must be articulated in a manner that is clear, precise, and specific.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that laws restricting speech that are 
vague or overbroad are invalid. The Supreme Court has also rejected as 
unconstitutional any system of censorship that reposits unbounded discretion in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972). 
18 See Yildirim v. Turkey, Pars. 57-59. 
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the decision-maker to determine whether or not speech is protected.   
 
First, without reference to the substantive categories of which speech can 
constitutionally be deemed illegal, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected laws that 
are framed in vague and imprecise terms -- both on First Amendment and on Due 
Process grounds -- because such laws fail to provide clear notice of what speech is 
prohibited and allow for government officials to exercise standardless discretion.  
The legislature is required to formulate laws regulating speech “with sufficient 
definiteness [so that] ordinary people can understand what is prohibited”19 and “in 
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”20  
The  “requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the protections provided 
by the Due Process Clause.” 21  A law will therefore be struck down as 
unconstitutionally vague if persons “of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”22  
 
Laws that do not clearly and precisely define the proscribed content are 
constitutionally infirm because they are fundamentally unfair. Such laws “trap the 
innocent by not providing fair warning” of what expression is prohibited and 
because they impermissibly delegate “basic policy matters to policemen, judges 
and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 
dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.”23 In particular, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has explained that vague laws have a chilling effect on expression, 
as such laws tend to lead citizens to “steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if 
the boundaries of the forbidden [were] clearly marked.”24  On these grounds, the 
Supreme Court has, for example, rejected a law that, in part, prohibited “treat[ing] 
contemptuously the flag of the United States,” because it failed “to draw 
reasonably clear lines between the kinds of . . .  treatment that are criminal and 
those that are not.”25 Although laws regulating non-expressive conduct may also 
be struck down on vagueness grounds, vague laws regulating expression are 
particularly carefully scrutinized because of the danger of chilling constitutionally 
protected speech.  As the Court has explained, “[b]ecause First Amendment 
freedoms need breathing space to survive, the government may regulate in the 
area only with narrow specificity.”26  
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also consistently rejected laws that are 
overbroad -- laws that sweep too broadly so as to encompass both unprotected 
speech and protected speech.  For example, a law that criminally prohibited the 
use of “opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
20 Id. 
21 United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304 (2008). 
22 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
23 Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-9 (1972). 
24 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 and n.5. 
25 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974). 
26 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963). 
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peace” was held to be unconstitutionally overbroad, even though it could 
constitutionally be applied to prohibit certain types of particularly harmful 
expression, because it could also be unconstitutionally applied to protected 
expression. 27   In addition, the Supreme Court has invalidated systems for 
licensing speech that vest unbridled discretion in the initial decision-maker.28  In 
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 29  for example, the Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of a parade permitting system that vested the City Commission 
with the broad discretion to deny parade permits if “in [the Commission’s] 
judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or 
convenience require that [the parade permit] be refused.”30 Because the permitting 
scheme conferred “virtually unbridled and absolute power” on the Commission, it 
failed to comport with the essential requirement that any law subjecting the 
exercise of First Amendment freedoms to a license must embody “narrow, 
objective, and definite standards.”31   
 
In summary, the International Covenant, the European Convention, and 
the United States First Amendment each provides strong support for the proposed 
principle of digital due process that countries be required to articulate narrow, 
specific descriptions of what speech is illegal, so as to confine the discretion of 
the decision-maker and so as to provide fair notice to individuals of what speech 
is illegal.  ICT companies should require that this first principle is complied with 
before acceding to any country’s or individual’s request to censor speech. 
 
Digital Due Process Principle 2: Before implementing any country’s 
request that they block content, ICT companies should ensure that 
affected parties have received notice in cases where their speech has been 
deemed illegal and have had the opportunity to be heard in a fair, 
independent, and impartial proceeding before a censorship decision is 
ordered. 
 
A fundamental component of living under the rule of law is that an individual be 
accorded with due process of law before his or her rights or liberties are abridged.  Due 
process of law generally requires that an individual be granted the opportunity to state her 
case before an impartial decision-maker before her rights or liberties are deprived – 
including her fundamental right to freedom of expression.  Accordingly, before an ICT 
company accedes to a country’s request to block content, the ICT company should ensure 
that the individual has received notice and has had the opportunity to be heard by a fair, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (to 
be unconstitutional, overbreadth of statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, in 
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep). 
28 Such standard-less discretion is an independent ground for finding the law unconstitutional, 
separate and apart from the absence or presence of a provision for judicial review of the initial 
decision-making determination, as discussed in greater detail infra. 
29 394 U.S. 147 (1969). 
30 Id. at 149-50. 
31 Id. at 150-51. 
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independent, and impartial proceeding within that country. The International Covenant, 
the European Convention, and the U.S. Constitution each provide support for this second 
proposed principle of digital due process, both in specific provisions protecting freedom 
of expression and in provisions protecting due process of law and fair trials. Below, I first 
describe the support these instruments provide for the second proposed principle from 
their freedom of expression provisions.  I then describe the support these instruments 
provide from their due process and fair trial provisions. 
 
II.A. Support from Freedom of Expression Provisions  
 
 In construing the free speech protections in the International Covenant, the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion 
and Expression has explained that: 
 
Any legislation restricting the right of freedom of expression must be 
applied . . . with adequate safeguards against abuse, including the 
possibility of challenge [before an independent body] and remedy against 
its abusive application.32  
 
The Special Rapporteur has emphasized, in particular, that in order to avoid infringing 
the freedom of expression rights of Internet users, ICT companies should  
 
only implement restrictions to [the right to freedom of expression] after 
judicial intervention …Any determination on what content should be 
blocked must be undertaken by a competent judicial authority or a body 
which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted 
influences.33 
 
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights in its recent decision in Yildirim 
v. Turkey has emphasized that any legislation mandating a restriction of freedom of 
expression in the form of Internet blocking or filtering must embody, at a minimum, a 
procedure providing for the appeal of such decision to a judicial decision-maker.34  
Under the U.S. Constitution, it has long has been understood that any 
government-mandated censorship of speech must be accompanied by judicial review of 
such a decision in order to be constitutional.  Any state-mandated censorship of speech 
prior to judicial review of the censorship decision constitutes a “prior restraint” that is 
presumptively unconstitutional.  Censorship ordered by the executive branch absence 
prompt judicial review of such a decision is presumptively invalid.  The availability of 
judicial review of any censorship decision is an essential requirement imposed on any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/17/27. 
33 Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/17/27 
Par. 47, 70. 
34 Yildirim v. Turkey, (Application no. 3111/10) at 27-28 (2012) (citations omitted). 
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state attempt to censor speech.  Judicial review of government orders restricting speech – 
and the concomitant notice to affected parties coupled with an opportunity to be heard in 
a judicial proceeding  -- is a fundamental procedural requirement within First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  U.S. courts have consistently emphasized the importance of 
the availability of prompt judicial review that affords the affected parties notice and an 
opportunity to be heard before the judicial decision-making regarding censorship 
determinations.35 As the Supreme Court has explained, “because only a judicial 
determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of 
expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid 
final [prior] restraint."36  
  
In a number of cases involving government attempts to censor speech, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has emphasized that a judicial determination is a necessary procedural 
safeguard in the context of the government abridgement of individuals’ freedom of 
expression.  The example of Bantam Books v. Sullivan37 is illustrative.  This case 
involved a censorship system for determining which books were legal and which were 
illegal – in the absence of a provision for judicial review of such determinations.  In that 
case, the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth was charged with 
investigating and recommending prosecution of booksellers for the distribution of printed 
works that were obscene or indecent. The Commission reviewed books and magazines in 
circulation, and notified distributors in cases in which a book or magazine had been 
distributed that the Commission found objectionable and for which removal from 
distribution was ordered. In reviewing the constitutionality of this scheme, the Supreme 
Court first explained that “the separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for . 
. . . sensitive tools” and reiterated its insistence that such censorship schemes must 
“scrupulously embody the most rigorous procedural safeguards.”38 The Court condemned 
the fact that, under the scheme at issue, “the publisher or distributor is not even entitled to 
notice and hearing before his publications are listed by the Commission as objectionable 
[and ordered for removal],” as well as the fact that there was “no provision whatever for 
judicial superintendence before notices issue or even for judicial review of the 
Commission’s determinations of objectionableness.”39 The Court concluded that, in the 
absence of these essential procedural safeguards, the “procedures of the Commission are 
radically deficient” and unconstitutional.40   
 
In sum, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the importance of 
providing affected individuals with notice and an opportunity to be heard in an 
adversarial judicial proceeding before an individual’s right to free speech is abridged.  
Absent such procedural safeguards, government orders to censor speech are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 372-74; Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 
436 (1957); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
36 See United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
37 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
38 Id. at 66. 
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
	   11	  
unconstitutional.  Under the First Amendment – as well as under the free speech 
protections accorded under the International Covenant and the European Convention – 
notice, opportunity to be heard, and a fair determination of one’s free speech rights by an 
independent decision-maker are required. 
 
II.B. Support from Due Process and Fair Trial Provisions 
The European Convention, the International Covenant, and the United States 
Constitution also contain provisions for due process of the law and fair trials rights that 
provide individuals fundamental protections before the state can abridge their right to 
freedom of expression and opinion.  Because state-mandated censorship orders result in a 
deprivation of individuals’ right to freedom of expression, fundamental principles of due 
process and fair trial rights as articulated in the European Convention, the International 
Covenant, and the U.S. Constitution require that any such deprivation occur only as a 
result of a fair, independent, and impartial decision-making process in which affected 
parties are provided with meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard.  These 
provisions provide further support for the second proposed principle of digital due 
process -- the right of the affected parties to receive notice that their speech has been 
deemed illegal and to have the opportunity to be heard in a fair, independent, and 
impartial proceeding before a censorship decision is ordered.   
 The right to a due process of law in general, and to a proper judicial determination 
of one’s rights in particular, is of ancient origin and has its roots in early English and 
American law.  The right to trial by due process of law can be traced to the Magna Carta, 
which provides that “No freeman shall be … disseised … of his liberties…except … by 
the law of the land.”41   One of the earliest express provisions for such procedural 
protections for individual rights is provided in Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
which provides that “no person shall … be deprived of . . . liberty … without due process 
of law.”  Similar language was included in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, providing that “ No State shall . . .  deprive any person of . . . liberty …, 
without due process of law.” Since the late 1800s, procedural due process has been linked 
to the concept of the rule of law.42 In the mid-twentieth century, the drafters of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized the importance of protecting due 
process rights, providing in Article 10 that “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair 
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
rights and obligations . . . .”  The European Convention on Human Rights was the first 
international human rights instrument to set forth detailed protections for due process and 
fair trial rights.43   With respect to the determination of civil rights and obligations, the 
Article 6 of the European Convention provides for the general right to procedural 
fairness, including a public hearing before a fair, independent, and impartial tribunal that 
provides a reasoned judgment.  Specifically, Article 6(1) states that “In the determination 
of his civil rights and obligations . . ., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Richard Clayton QC and Hugh Tomlinson QC, The Law of Human Rights, at 708 (quoting 
clause 39 of the Magna Carta of 1215). 
42 Clayton and Tomlinson, 709. 
43 Clayton and Tomlinson, 706 
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within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” 
Article 14 of the International Covenant similarly provides that “In the determination . . . 
his rights and obligations . . . , everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”  In each of these 
foundational documents and instruments, procedural due process rights and the right to 
independent, impartial, and fair judicial determinations of one’s civil and human rights 
are recognized as necessary for the meaningful protection of substantive rights, including 
the right to freedom of expression.  In the words of human rights theorists Richard 
Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson, “[t]he protection of human rights therefore begins but does 
not end with fair trial rights.”44 
 Article 6 of the European Convention guarantees procedural fairness “whenever 
there is a ‘determination’ of a ‘civil right or obligation.’”45  The European Court of 
Human Rights has repeatedly emphasized the centrality of the rights of procedural due 
process articulated in Article 6(1) and has affirmed that an expansive view of these rights 
is fundamental to protecting civil and human rights in democratic societies: 
In a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention the right to 
a fair administration of justice holds such a prominent place that a 
restrictive interpretation of Article 6(1) would not correspond to the aim 
and purpose of that provision.46 
Similarly, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that 
before an individual’s liberty is deprived by the state, she must be afforded certain 
fundamental procedural protections.  The courts have repeatedly held that the protections 
provided in the Due Process Clause apply specifically in the content of the deprivation of 
one’s First Amendment right to freedom of expression. As constitutional commentators 
Rotunda and Nowak explain, 
In their procedural aspects, the due process clauses require that the government not 
restrict a specific individual's freedom to exercise a fundamental constitutional right 
without a process to determine the basis for the restriction. . . [In particular,] 
whenever the government seeks to restrain speech, there must be a prompt procedure 
to determine whether the speech may be limited in conformity with First 
Amendment principles.  
Under the Due Process Clause, before the state deprives an individual of a substantial 
liberty interest such as the right to freedom of expression, the individual must be 
accorded at a minimum: adequate notice of the charges or basis for government action; an 
opportunity to be heard by the decision-maker; a determination by a neutral decision-
maker; and a decision based on the record with a statement of reasons for the decision.47 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Clayton and Tomlinson, 705. 
45 Clayton and Tomlinson, 712. 
46 Delcourt v. Belgium (1970), 1 EHRR 355, para. 25, cited in Clayton and Tomlinson, 824. 
47 See Treatise on Constitutional Law-Substance & Procedure 
Database updated June 2013, Ronald D. Rotunda, John E. Nowak, Chapter 17. Procedural Due 
Process—The Requirement of Fair Adjudicative Procedures/ II. Deprivations of “Life, Liberty, or 
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First, regarding the requirement of notice, when the state is considering impairing an 
individual’s constitutionally cognizable liberty interest – such as her right to freedom of 
expression --  notice must be provided: “An elementary and fundamental requirement of 
due process in any proceeding … is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 
them an opportunity to present their objections.”  Regarding the nature of the 
determination, “[w]hile different situations may entail different types of procedures, there 
is always the general requirement that the government process be fair and impartial. . . .  
[since] “a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”  
In summary, the freedom of expression provisions, as well as the due 
process and fair trial provision, of international, European, and U.S. instruments 
provide support for the second proposed principle of digital due process – that 
before ICT companies implement a country’s request that they block content, ICT 
companies should require that affected parties have received notice that their 
speech has been deemed illegal and have had the opportunity to be heard in a fair, 
independent, and impartial proceeding before the censorship decision was 
ordered. 
 
Digital Due Process Principle 3: Before implementing any country’s 
request that they block content, ICT companies should require that 
the requesting country has issued a narrowly tailored, final judicial 
decision adjudicating the subject speech as illegal 
 Before complying with any government’s request to censor content, ICT 
companies should require a court order that is narrowly tailored to achieve the 
compelling government interest at stake in regulating the speech at issue.  Because of the 
paramount importance of freedom of expression in democratic societies, limitations on 
this freedom, when imposed, should be imposed as narrowly as possible.  Before 
implementing any country’s blocking order, ICT companies should ensure that the order 
is narrowly tailored. The International Covenant, the European Convention, and the U.S. 
First Amendment each provides support for this proposed principle of digital due process.  
First, as discussed above, the International Covenant’s freedom of expression 
provisions require that laws or orders restricting freedom of expression be narrowly 
tailored.  The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression explains that: 
 
Any limitation to the right to freedom of expression must . . . be proven as 
necessary and the least restrictive means required to achieve the purported 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Property” for Which Some Process Is Due § 17.4. Liberty, 17.4(c) Fundamental Constitutional 
Rights 
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aim (principles of necessity and proportionality). 
 
In addition, in its First Amendment jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
repeatedly emphasized that any judicial order regulating speech must be narrowly 
tailored.  Such orders “must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the 
pinpointed objective permitted by the [Constitution]”48 and must “burden no more speech 
than is necessary”49 to accomplish its objective.   
Consistent with the importance of freedom of expression to democratic societies, 
any judicial order restraining expression must be framed in as narrow a manner as 
possible to require the surgical blocking of the offending content.  Therefore, before 
implementing any country’s request that they block content, ICT companies should 
require that the requesting country has issued a narrowly tailored judicial decision 
adjudicating the subject speech as illegal. 
 
Digital Due Process Principle 4: ICT companies should implement a 
country’s blocking order only within the country mandating such 
blocking 
A foundational principle of national sovereignty is that each nation possesses full 
control over the affairs within its territorial, geographic boundaries.  Under general 
international law principles, jurisdiction is a nation’s assertion of power over 
the people, properties, and activities within its borders.  According to this 
foundational principle,  
The first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a 
State is that - failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it 
may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State.  
[Jurisdiction] cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by 
virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a 
convention.50 
 While nations enjoy the power to determine the substantive laws within their own territories, they 
do not enjoy the right to dictate laws that apply outside of their territories.  Thus, any order issued by a 
court mandating that certain content be blocked should be given effect only within the boundaries of that 
country.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Carroll v. President and Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968). 
49 Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994). 
50 The Case of the S.S. "Lotus”, PCIJ, Ser. A., No. 10 (1927), §19. 
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In recent years, as discussed in greater detail below, certain countries have sought to bring about 
the worldwide censorship of speech that offended their national laws but that was protected in other 
countries.  Turkey, for example, urged Google to block access throughout the world to content that 
allegedly insulted the memory of its founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk – a criminal offense in 
Turkey.  Although Google blocked access to such content for Internet users in Turkey, 
Turkish officials apparently claimed that this country-specific blocking was insufficient 
to protect the rights of Turks living abroad. Google properly refused to accede to this 
additional, overreaching request to export Turkey’s laws to the rest of the world. Because 
countries generally enjoy the sovereign power to dictate the free speech rights of their 
people only within their borders, Google was right to refuse Turkey’s request in this 
instance.  Consistent with the limited sovereignty of each nation, ICT companies should 
implement a country’s valid blocking order only within the country mandating such 
blocking. 
Digital Due Process Principle 5: ICT companies should implement a 
country’s blocking order in an open and transparent manner.    
An important part of living in a democratic society governed by the rule of law is 
that individuals are able to know what the law is and how that law is applied to them.  In 
order to engage in the task of democratic self-government, individuals need to be aware 
of what the law is and how it is applied, so that they can effectively hold the government 
accountable for its actions.  Governments must adopt, implement, and enforce laws in a 
public, open, and transparent manner, so that individuals have the meaningful ability to 
check the power of the government and to hold the government accountable for their 
decision-making.  Laws that are adopted, implemented, or enforced in a secretive or 
opaque manner violate these principles and thwart the goals of democratic self-
government.   As de facto sovereigns acting to implement the blocking mandates of 
countries around the world, ICT companies should implement the blocking mandates in a 
manner that is open and transparent, so that affected individuals are made aware that the 
content at issue is being blocked by the ICT company at the request of their country.  
Implementing blocking mandates in an open and transparent manner will enable affected 
individuals to hold their governments accountable and thereby to exercise the rights that 
are fundamental to individuals living in democratic societies. 
 
The International Covenant, the European Convention, and the First Amendment 
support the public, open, and transparent implementation of the law and provide support 
for the fifth proposed principle of digital due process.  
The First Amendment provides individuals with the right to access information 
concerning government decision-making and in particular, with access to judicial records 
and judicial proceedings.51  Court decisions and court orders are generally publicly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1984) (establishing a First Amendment 
right of access to records submitted in connection with criminal proceedings); Oregon Publishing 
	   16	  
available, so that individuals can hold the government properly accountable for its 
judicial decision-making.   Granting individuals access to information regarding judicial 
proceedings is essential for individuals to serve as effective check on government.52  If 
the government were to implement judicial decisions in an opaque or secretive manner, 
this essential component of democratic self-government would be thwarted.  
The International Covenant’s freedom of expression provisions also provide 
support for this proposed principle of digital due process. In construing the International 
Covenant’s protections for freedom of expression, the Special Rapporteur has 
emphasized that in order to avoid infringing the freedom of expression rights of Internet 
users, Internet intermediaries in implementing any blocking or filtering requests should 
“be transparent to the user involved about the measures taken, and where applicable to 
the wider public.”53 Such transparency is necessary to achieve the goals of democratic 
self-government to enable individuals to hold in check the power of their government. 
  
As the entities responsible for implementing the blocking orders of governments 
around the world, ICT companies should implement these orders in a manner that is open 
and transparent, so that affected individuals can hold their governments properly 
accountable for their actions.   
ICT Companies’ Current Policies Regarding Responses to Countries’ Blocking Orders 
 Global ICT companies exercise great discretion in determining whether to accede 
to content removal orders issued from countries or individuals around the world.  
Although companies like Google have provided a wealth of information regarding the 
requests they receive and their actions in response to these requests, they tend to provide 
far less information about the guidelines they follow in determining whether to comply 
with such requests.  While Google is to be commended for publishing its semiannual 
Transparency Reports with detailed information about requests it has received from 
governments to remove content and Google’s actions in response to such requests,54 the 
only information to be gleaned from its transparency reports is that Google may choose to 
remove content at the request of a government body when such content violates local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1990)(extending qualified right of 
access to plea agreements and related documents in criminal cases). 
 
52 See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F. 2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989); In re Globe 
Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Antar, 38 
F.3d 1348, 1359-60 (3d Cir. 1994). 
53 Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/17/27 
Par. 47, 70. 
54 http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/government/ 
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law, but it may also choose not to remove such content.55  YouTube reports that it will 
accede to governments’ request to remove content if and only if the content is in violation 
of YouTube’s Community Guidelines, which prohibit a variety of categories of speech 
(including categories of speech that are protected by the First Amendment, like 
“ insulting generalizations about people of a particular nationality”.)56  Facebook 
provides users with a list of rights and responsibilities and indicates that it has the 
discretion to remove content that is in violation of these rights and responsibilities.57  Yet, 
Facebook has been relatively opaque in its determinations of what content to remove and 
does not publish a transparency report similar to that made available by Google and 
Google/YouTube.58 
By comparison, Twitter has been both transparent and clear regarding the policies 
it has adopted governing content removal.  In January 2012, Twitter announced its 
adoption of a relatively speech-protective policy by which it will censor speech within 
the country requesting censorship upon receipt of a valid order from the country 
mandating censorship.  Under the policy, Twitter will provide notice to affected parties 
(both content providers and would-be recipients of such content) of the censorship 
(unless it is prohibited from doing so by law).  Twitter sets forth its content removal 
policy as follows:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See for example Google’s Answer to the Frequently Asked Question: “ Q. Why haven't 
you complied with all of the content removal requests? A. There are many reasons we 
may not have removed content in response to a request. Some requests may not be 
specific enough for us to know what the government wanted us to remove (for example, 
no URL is listed in the request), and others involve allegations of defamation through 
informal letters from government agencies, rather than court orders. We generally rely on 
courts to decide if a statement is defamatory according to local law.” 
 
56 See http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines  
57 See https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (providing, inter alia: “You will not 
bully, intimidate, or harass any user. …You will not post content that: is hate speech, 
threatening, or pornographic; incites violence; or contains nudity or graphic or gratuitous 
violence…….You will not use Facebook to do anything unlawful, misleading, malicious, 
or discriminatory…You will not post content or take any action on Facebook that infringes 
or violates someone else's rights or otherwise violates the law.…We can remove any 
content or information you post on Facebook if we believe that it violates this Statement or 
our policies.”) 
 
58 See, e.g., http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1667&context=iclr  
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Many countries. . . have laws that may apply to Tweets and/or Twitter 
account content. [I]f we receive a valid and properly scoped request from 
an authorized entity, it may be necessary to reactively withhold access to 
certain content in a particular country from time to time. 
… Upon receipt of requests to withhold content, we will promptly notify 
affected users unless we believe we are legally prohibited from doing so 
(for example, if we receive an order under seal). We also clearly indicate 
within the product when content has been withheld. And, we have 
expanded our partnership with Chilling Effects to publish … requests to 
withhold content -- unless, similar to our practice of notifying users, we 
are legally prohibited from doing so. 
Withheld Tweets: 
If you see a grayed-out Tweet in your timeline . . . or on another user's 
account . . . , it means that access to that Tweet has been withheld in your 
country. 
Withheld accounts: 
Similarly, if you see a grayed-out user in your timeline . . . or elsewhere 
on Twitter . . . , access to that particular account has been withheld in your 
country. 
. . . Upon receipt of a request to withhold content, Twitter will attempt to 
notify affected users of the request via the email address we have on file, 
identifying the specific content withheld and the origin of the request, in 
addition to marking withheld Tweets and/or accounts with a visual 
indicator.  
Twitter’s content removal policy has many virtues.  It is speech-protective in that 
Twitter will only withhold access for individuals within the country making that request, 
and it will provide notice both to the Twitter account holder and the would-be recipients 
of the content that the content has been withheld and the origin of the request for 
withholding the content.  The policy therefore complies with the fourth and fifth 
proposed principles of digital due process, requiring the surgical implementation of 
blocking orders by the ICT company only within the country mandating such blocking; 
and the implementation of such blocking order by the ICT company in a manner that is 
open and transparent.  However, the provision of the policy in which Twitter responds to 
“valid and properly scoped request from an authorized entity” leaves some room for 
interpretation. Depending on how Twitter interprets its requirement of a “properly scoped 
request,” this requirement may be consistent with the first and third proposed principle of 
digital due process, requiring that countries articulate narrow, specific descriptions of 
what speech is illegal, and requiring a narrowly tailored, reasoned final judicial decision 
adjudicating the subject speech as illegal.  Further, Twitter’s content removal policy is 
deficient in that it merely requires a valid and properly scoped request from an authorized 
entity. It apparently does not require a fair, independent, and impartial judicial 
determination of whether the content is illegal within the country requesting that the 
content be withheld.  Indeed, as discussed below, in its first action to withhold content 
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under this policy, Twitter agreed to withhold content upon request from a non-judicial 
authority in Germany, as discussed below.  This aspect of Twitter’s policy does not 
comport with the second proposed principle of digital due process – ensuring that 
affected parties the have the opportunity to be heard in a fair, independent, and impartial 
judicial proceeding before a censorship decision is ordered – and is insufficiently 
protective of free speech, as discussed in greater detail below.   
Case Studies and Recommendations For Implementation of Principles of Digital Due 
Process 
 Having articulated a set of proposed principles of digital due process that ICT 
companies should adhere to in responding to censorship requests from governments 
around the world, I now examine how the implementation of these principles would have 
proceeded in the context of several recent cases involving restrictions on Internet speech. 
Case Study 1: Yildirim v. Turkey 
In Yildirim v. Turkey, Ahmet Yildirim, a national of Turkey and doctoral student, 
sued the Republic of Turkey for violating his free speech rights under Article 10 and his 
fair trial rights under Article 6 of European Convention. The difficulties arose for 
Yildirim in June 2009 when another website – with whom Yildirim had no connection – 
posted content via Google Sites (a website creation platform) that allegedly insulted the 
memory of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (founder of the Republic of Turkey), which 
constitutes a crime in Turkey.   In response, the Denizli Criminal Court of the First 
Instance, pursuant to its law regulating Internet publications, ordered the blocking of the 
offending website, as a preventive measure in the context of criminal proceedings against 
the site’s owner.   The Court then sent its order requiring the blocking of the offending 
website to the Telecommunications and Information Technology Directorate (the “TIB”) 
for execution.  The TIB, upon receiving this narrowly targeted blocking order, 
complained that it did not have the means of only blocking the offending site, and instead 
requested that the Court modify its mandate to order the blocking of all access to Google 
Sites in its entirety.   The Criminal Court complied, modifying its order to require the 
blocking of Google Sites in its entirely.  The TIB then implemented this order and 
rendered all Google Sites content inaccessible within the country.  At no time in this 
process did the Court or the TIB notify Google or request that Google Sites render the 
offending site inaccessible within Turkey. Once the TIB rendered the entire Google Sites 
platform and all of its content inaccessible, Yildirim – who used Google Sites as a 
platform to publish his academic work – was unable to access his content, including his 
academic articles and commentary, on his Google Sites website (available at http://sites.google.com/a/ahmetyildirim.com.tr/academic/).  Yildirim applied to have the 
court’s blocking order modified and narrowed, in favor of a method of implementation 
that would make only the offending website inaccessible, such as by blocking the 
offending site’s URL.  The Court dismissed Yildirim’s application for a modified order, 
explaining that the TIB had insisted that the only means of blocking access to the 
offending website was to block access to the entirety of Google Sites.  Three years later, 
after the criminal case against the owner of the offending website was dropped, the 
entirety of Google Sites remained blocked within Turkey and Yildirim’s Google Sites 
website remained inaccessible within Turkey.  Seeking redress, Yildirim brought an 
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action against the Republic of Turkey, alleging violations, inter alia, of Article 10 and 
Article 6 of the European Convention.  
 How might this situation have been resolved in a less speech-unfriendly manner? 
Assuming that countries have the right to block within their country – or have blocked 
within their country -- web content that is illegal within their country, first, courts should 
craft blocking orders in as narrow and specific a manner as possible, and each global 
Internet platform should implement such judicial orders in as narrow and specific a 
manner as possible.  In the Yildirim case, the Turkish criminal court – after determining 
that the content on the offending site violated its law prohibiting clear, precise, and 
narrowly drawn categories of content, and after giving the owner of the offending site 
notice of the charge and an opportunity to be heard by the court -- should have ordered 
the TIB to block access within Turkey to the offending site – and only the offending site.  
If the TIB was unable surgically to block access only to the offending site (as the TIB 
claimed was in fact the case), the TIB or the court could have requested that Google 
block access only to the offending website and only within Turkey.59 
Once presented with a request from the Turkish criminal court or the TIB in 
furtherance of the court’s order, Google could have taken steps to ensure that the first 
four digital due process requirements were met:  first, that the applicable country’s law 
articulates a narrow, specific description of what speech is illegal; second, that affected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In the past, the Turkish government has expressed dissatisfaction with country-specific 
blocking, claiming that Internet content illegal within Turkey – like the content at issue in the 
offending website that allegedly insulted the memory of Ataturk -- should be rendered 
inaccessible by Google for all Internet users, including those outside of Turkey.  For example, in 
June 2008, after Google agreed to block access within Turkey to a series of videos on YouTube 
that a Turkish court held were violative of Turkish law, see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10480877, the Turkish government was apparently unsatisfied 
and demanded that Google implement worldwide blocking of such content, claiming that a 
worldwide block was necessary to protect the rights and sensitivities of Turks living outside of 
Turkey. See Jeffrey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, The New York Times, November 30, 2008.  
When Google refused to expand the scope of the geographic scope of the block to all countries, 
the Turkish government decided to block access to all of YouTube, which it proceeded to do for 
the next two and a half years, until the offending videos were removed from YouTube (by a party 
other than YouTube itself).  See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-­‐11659816.   
Indeed, Turkey blocked not only YouTube but also a host of other Google services, because it 
was apparently unclear which of Google’s designated IP addresses it was using for YouTube 
services and which it was using for other services. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10480877.  In such a case, it is unreasonable for Turkey to seek 
to export its idiosyncratic, country-specific laws regarding illegal content, and it is further 
unreasonable to block access to the entire video-sharing platform of YouTube – and other 
unrelated Google services -- because of a small handful of offending websites on YouTube that 
YouTube had already agreed to block for residents of Turkey.  
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Internet users received meaningful notice of categories of illegal speech and had 
opportunity to be heard by a court before their right to freedom of speech/information is 
abridged; third, that decisions to block content were made in an impartial, independent 
judicial proceeding; and fourth, that the court’s decision was narrowly tailored to avoid 
collateral censorship/overbreadth and specified precisely which Internet speech is illegal.   
Once it was satisfied that the country and its courts met the requirements of digital due 
process, Google should then implement its technology in general and the blocking order 
in particular in a manner that comports with digital due process by first, implementing the 
court’s decision in a manner that is narrow, open and transparent.  The blocking order 
should be narrowly implementing to block access only to the content judicially 
determined to be illegal and only within the country making that determination.  The 
blocking order should be implemented in an open and transparent manner, so as give 
meaningful notice to those seeking access to the blocked site that Google blocked the site 
in accordance with a valid court order.    
Case Study 2: Twitter and Blocking of Neo-Nazi Tweets 
In October 2012, Twitter received from German police a request to close the 
account of the neo-Nazi organization of Besseres Hannover.  The German police 
informed Twitter that Besseres Hannover "is disbanded, its assets are seized and all its 
accounts in social networks have to be closed immediately." The police asked that 
Twitter block Besseres Hannover’s account and prevent it from opening alternate 
accounts.60 In the first instance of its implementation of its new censorship policy, 
Twitter responding by blocking the tweets of the organization within Germany, but 
declining to close the organization’s account. Twitter also provided notice to German 
users that this organization’s tweets were blocked within Germany, and provided access 
to the German authorities’ documents requesting the block.  Under the policy, Besseres 
Hannover’s tweets will appear to German users as greyed-out boxes with the words 
"@Username withheld" and "This account has been withheld in: Germany."61  Twitter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See https://www.chillingeffects.org/notice.cgi?sID=625342 (providing letter from the Head of the 
Police Administration Department, Hannover, Germany, to Twitter, which indicates:  “the 
Ministry of the Interior of the State of Lower-Saxony in Germany has banned the organisation 
"Besseres Hannover". It is disbanded, its assets are seized and all its accounts in social networks 
have to be closed immediately. The Public Prosecutor (State Attorney's Office) has launched an 
investigation on suspicion of forming a criminal association. It is the task of the Polizeidirektion 
Hannover (Hannover Police) to enforce the ban. The organisation "Besseres Hannover" uses the 
Twitter account 
besseres-hannover@hannoverticker 
https://twitter.com/hannoverticker. I ask you to close this account immediately and not to open any 
substitute accounts for the organisation "Besseres Hannover".) 
 
61 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/10/18/twitter_censors_neo_nazi_group_besseres_h
annover_is_first_user_blocked_under.html 
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has also received requests from countries to make available the identities of individuals 
who post illegal content.62 
How might this situation have been resolved in a less speech-unfriendly manner? 
Although Twitter’s implementation of its “country-withheld content” policy is relatively 
speech-protective, the policy suffers in that it does not require that the content’s illegality 
be determined in the context of a fair, impartial, and independent judicial determination. 
Twitter should only block access to this organization’s tweets when and if it receives an 
order resulting from an impartial, independent judicial proceeding determining that this 
speech was illegal. 
 
Case Study 3: Turkey’s Demand that YouTube Block Access Throughout the World to 
Video Content that Violated Turkish Law 
The Republic of Turkey has had a tumultuous relationship with Google/YouTube.  
In March 2007, a Turkish judge ordered the nation’s telecommunications providers to 
block access to all of YouTube in response to videos that allegedly insulted the founder 
of the Republic of Turkey Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, which is a crime in Turkey.  The 
video that initially sparked the controversy was a parody news broadcast that declared, 
“Today’s news: Kamal Ataturk was gay!’” posted by Greek soccer fans to insult their 
Turkish rivals.  The ban on YouTube was ordered and implemented by Turkish officials 
without consulting with Google/YouTube and without asking the company to surgically 
block access to only the offending video.  The offending video was eventually taken 
down, apparently by the individuals who initially posted it, but even after it was taken 
down, Turkish prosecutors found dozens of other YouTube videos that they claimed 
insulted either Ataturk or “Turkishness,” in order to justify the continued blocking of 
YouTube in its entirety.   
Upon learning that access to all of YouTube was being blocked in Turkey, Google 
executives worked to develop a solution that would placate Turkish officials.  The 
executives set about attempting to determine which videos were clearly in violation of 
Turkish law prohibiting insults to Ataturk or Turkishness, and then blocking access to 
those videos within Turkey.  Google’s plan seemed to be satisfactory to Turkish 
authorities for a period of time, but then in June 2007, a Turkish prosecutor demanded 
that Google block access to the offending videos not just in Turkey but throughout the 
world, asserting the need to protect the rights and sensitivities of Turks living outside the 
country.  Google refused to implement this extraterritorial blocking mandate, and in 
response, the Turkish government once again blocked access to YouTube in its entirety. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 In January 2013, a French court ordered Twitter to identify people who had posted anti-Semitic 
and racist entries on the social network. See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/technology/twitter-­‐ordered-­‐to-­‐help-­‐reveal-­‐sources-­‐of-­‐anti-­‐semitic-­‐posts.html?_r=0  
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  How might this situation have been resolved in a less speech-unfriendly manner? 
First, Google should determine whether Turkey has articulated its laws prohibiting 
attacks on Ataturk and Turkishness in a narrow and precise manner, so as to provide 
individuals within Turkey with adequate notice as to what content is prohibited.  Second, 
Turkish courts should provide the owners of offending sites with notice of the charge and 
an opportunity to be heard by the court determining whether their content violated 
Turkish law.  Third, if warranted, the Turkish court should craft any blocking orders in as 
narrow and specific a manner as possible with the least impact on freedom of expression. 
Google/YouTube should not block access to content on its own, without a valid court 
order identifying specifically which content is to be blocked. Fourth, Google should 
implement any valid court blocking orders only with respect to individuals within 
Turkey, rendering such content inaccessible only for individuals within Turkey.  The 
Turkish government’s request to block access to such sites throughout the world – in 
order to protect the rights and sensitivities of Turks living outside the country -- oversteps 
that sovereign’s authority and jurisdiction.   Fifth, Google should implement any valid 
court blocking order in a manner that is open and transparent and provides notice to 
affected individuals that the requested content has been blocked because of a court order, 
so that those individuals can hold their government properly accountable for its speech-
restrictive decisions.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 Global ICT companies like Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Yahoo enjoy great 
power to control what expression is facilitated and what expression is censored in the 
global marketplace of ideas.  And, in the words of Voltaire (and Spiderman), with great 
power comes great responsibility.  ICT companies should wield their great power 
responsibly, which means adhering to the principles of digital due process that are 
implicit in the foundational instruments of the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the United States 
Constitution.  
 
 
 
